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Perfectionism and Moral Reasoning
Matteo Falomi
1 Since the late  eighties,  Stanley Cavell  has  begun presenting his  reflections on ethics
under  the  heading  of  Moral  Perfectionism.1 Cavell’s  way  of  using  the  notion  of
perfectionism, though, considerably departs from the meaning the term has acquired in
contemporary moral  philosophy.  In current debate,  the word “perfectionism” usually
names a certain kind of teleological theory, one that aims (as Rawls put it) at maximizing
the good of “human excellence in art, science, and culture.”2 In Cavell’s understanding,
instead,  perfectionism should  not  be  seen “as  a  competing  moral  theory  […]  but  as
emphasizing a dimension of the moral life any theory of it may wish to accommodate.”3
One  might  provisionally  articulate  the  difference  between  Cavell’s  notion  of
perfectionism and the homonymous moral theory by saying that perfectionism, in
Cavell’s interpretation of it, focuses on a kind of moral difficulty that diverges from the
ones  usually  considered  in  normative  theories:  while  these  theories  try  to  answer
questions about action, perfectionism concentrates on what Cavell variously describes as
difficulties of “self-knowledge”4 of “becoming intelligible to oneself,”5 of “being true to
oneself,”6 of “being lost to oneself” and “finding one’s way,” 7 of “[becoming] the one I
am.”8 To put the contrast more sharply, one might say that while moral theories tries to
answer questions of the form “What ought I to do?,” perfectionism concerns itself with
questions of the form “Who am I?”
2 Attention to this latter sort of difficulties requires, according to Cavell’s account, modes
of moral reasoning that deviate from the ones privileged in canonical moral theories:9
when one  is  confronted with  difficulties  of  self-understanding,  appeals  to  utilitarian
calculations of consequences or Kantian generalizations of maxims may fail to make
contact  with one’s  actual  concerns.10 Cavell,  on the other hand,  eschews any general
characterization of the mode of thinking he associates with perfectionism: any version of
perfectionism, in Cavell’s view, will provide its own specific concepts and methods of self-
understanding;  the  lineaments  of  perfectionist  reasoning  are  therefore  indicated  by
Cavell  through an enumeration of  examples  of  perfectionist  texts,  rather  than fixed
through a theoretical description.11 For this reason, it is hard to convey in a few lines the
breadth and flexibility of Cavell’s conception of perfectionism; in order to give at least a
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rough sense of what Cavell is prepared to count as an instance of perfectionist reasoning,
I will list here a few examples that are relevant to Cavell’s discussion:
1.  Emerson’s characterization of  the reading of  a “work of  genius” as enabling us to
“recognize  our  own rejected  thoughts”  coming back  to  us  “with  a  certain  alienated
majesty.”12
2. Kierkegaard’s strategies of indirect communication, as allowing us to realize that “we
have lost the capacity, for subjectivity, for inwardness, and therewith the capacity for
Christianity.”13
3. Freud’s methods of free association and dream interpretation, putting the patient in a
position  to  recognize  the  elements  of  his  inner  life  whose  repression  has  led  to
psychological disorders.14
4. Rousseau’s appeals to the idea of a social contract, as facilitating the acknowledgement
that we have consented to “the specific inequalities,  lacks of freedom and absence of
fraternity”15 that characterize our society as it stands.
5. Wittgenstein’s methods of bringing words back to their everyday use, as enabling us to
become aware that, in philosophy, we do not know what we mean by our words and that
we are attracted by these nonsensical words because we want to refuse our human form
of life. 16
3 As it will be apparent even from this brief (and somewhat arbitrary) list, not only the
methods of self-knowledge that Cavell deems relevant for perfectionism are extremely
diverse, but each of these methods presupposes a different idea of self-knowledge: the
kind of self-understanding delivered by Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations, for
instance,  will  diverge  from the one provided by  Freudian therapies,  and so  on.  Any
attempt  to  characterize  perfectionist  self-knowledge  in  general  is  then  bound  to  be
partial or misleading. If one is nonetheless to indicate a pattern, one might say that all
these  authors  respond,  in  different  ways,  to  a  peculiar  kind of  confusion about  our
conception of ourselves: we incur in such a confusion when we think that our present
mode of life (or some feature of it) is really expressive of who we are, when in fact this is
not the case. Emerson’s reader, for instance, is imagined to be in a state of conformity, in
which he believes that his present thoughts and tastes are his own, while he is actually
imitating  someone  else;  Kierkegaard’s  believer  takes  himself  to  be  a  Christian,  and
therefore lives under the illusion that “such thing as Christendom exists, that one can be
a Christian simply by being born in a Christian state, by Christian parents, and by being
given a Christian name and nomenclature”;17 Freud’s patient is affected by systematic
delusions over the real object of his desires; Rousseau’s citizen hallucinates the real object
of  his  consent;  Wittgenstein’s  philosopher,  who  believes  that  in  putting  forward
metaphysical propositions he is describing how things stand with an unprejudiced eye,
turns out to be possessed by a refusal of the human.
4 All these methods of self-knowledge, in other words, may be said to exploit the idea of a
mismatch between our present description of ourselves and our actual situation; they all
respond to the sense that, as Nietzsche put the point in Schopenhauer as Educator, “all you
are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself.”18 The perfectionist quest for self-
knowledge may be said to begin, in this perspective, with the acknowledgement that our
present  mode of  life  is  not  really  ours;  the different  modes of  reasoning that  Cavell
associates with the perfectionist tradition will then provide ways to come to terms with
this acknowledgement.
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⁂
5 This admittedly crude sketch of perfectionism as a mode of moral reasoning is meant to
prepare the ground for, and give some substance to, the question that I will consider in
the rest of this paper.  Even if  one is willing to concede that the modes of reasoning
indicated by Cavell  can aptly be described as methods of self-knowledge,  and even if
(what is likely to be even more problematic) one is willing to see such methods as modes
of reasoning, one might still wonder why Cavell insists to call these methods modes of
moral reasoning. Moral reasoning, at least in a canonical understanding of it, is associated
with the idea of an exchange of moral reasons for or against a certain course of action.
What kind of connection can be drawn between this mode of discourse and the methods
of self-understanding indicated by Cavell? It is not immediately evident, indeed, why one
should count Freudian analysis or Wittgensteinian grammatical investigations as forms of
moral reasoning. The sense that such methods are not relevant for moral thinking is
registered, as Cavell himself notes, in the fact that most of the authors he associates with
the perfectionist tradition are not normally included in the canon of moral philosophy
(the claim holds also for the names mentioned in our brief inventory of perfectionist
methods; other authors that Cavell includes in the perfectionist genre, and that are not
generally seen as moral philosophers, are for instance Shakespeare, Schlegel, Thoreau,
Ibsen, Marx, Heidegger, Beckett, etc.).19
6 The exclusion of perfectionism from moral philosophy might be motivated by the sense
that the perfectionist questioning of the self is too private or too idiosyncratic to count as
proper moral reasoning. But the perfectionist pursuit of self-knowledge may also invite
more specific forms of resistance: one might think, for instance, that the concentration
on the self  that  characterizes perfectionism is  not simply irrelevant to morality,  but
rather  actively  opposed  to  its  aspirations.  In  this  perspective,  as  Cavell  writes,
perfectionism “may appear not to have arrived at the idea,  or to disdain it,  of other
persons as counting in moral judgement with the same weight as oneself, hence to lack
the concept of morality altogether.”20
7 A version of this concern emerges in Cavell’s short discussion, in the preface to Conditions
Handsome and Unhandsome, of the figure of the “scoundrel.” With this term, Cavell wishes
to  designate  those  who  “find  their  nature  expressed  in  unshared  and  unshareable
principles”21 (the term itself  harks  back to Rawls’  response to  an objection Sidgwick
raised against Kant’s moral philosophy: in Sidgwick’s perspective, both the saint and the
scoundrel are expressing their rational nature in their lives, if those lives are the outcome
of  their  free choice).  The possibility of  such a figure,  of  course,  may cast  doubts  on
perfectionism’s  claim to the status  of  moral  reasoning.  The scoundrel,  indeed,  has  a
commitment to self-knowledge and self-realization, but this very commitment leads him
to immorality: the scoundrel’s concentration on his own self, in other words, elicits in
him a disdain for the idea that others count as him in moral judgement. This suggests
that  a  dedication  to  self-knowledge  is  at  least  independent  from  a  commitment  to
morality, when it is not positively in conflict with it: and this, in turn, may make it hard
to see how the methods of self-knowledge Cavell associates with perfectionism may count
as instances of moral reasoning.
8 In  this  paper,  I  will  provide  an  interpretation  of  Cavell’s  claim  that  perfectionism
constitutes a mode of moral  reasoning.  As I  will  try to show, in Cavell’s  perspective,
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perfectionism not only contributes to moral thinking, but is also vital to it. While Cavell
does not offer a sustained and explicit argument to back these claims, I believe that, by
rearranging certain themes that recur in his writings on morality, one might reconstruct
Cavell’s line of reasoning on this point. In doing so I will focus, in particular, on Cavell’s
account of moral reasoning in Part 3 of The Claim of Reason: even if this account precedes
the explicit introduction of the notion of perfectionism, some features of it may shed
light  on  Cavell’s  understanding  of  the  relation  between  moral  reasoning  and
perfectionism (in adopting this approach, I will expand a parenthetical suggestion that
Cavell enters in the Preface to Condition Handsome and Unhandsome, where he remarks that
his writings on perfectionism are “however unpredictably, something of a continuation of
the chapters in moral philosophy that constitutes Part 3 of The Claim of Reason”).22 My
aims in this paper will be mainly exegetical: in what follows I will not critically assess the
conception of moral reasoning that Cavell puts forward, nor will I discuss the merits of
his  elaboration  of  perfectionism.  What  I  hope  to  do  is  only  to  make  available  an
underlying connection between these two regions of Cavell’s thinking,  and to clarify,
thereby, the sense in which Cavell’s work on perfectionism may constitute a contribution
to moral philosophy.
⁂
9 One might follow many paths in Cavell’s intricate discussion of moral reasoning in Part 3
of The Claim of Reason. For my present purposes, I will organize Cavell’s remarks around
the following question:  What is  the point  of moral  reasoning? Why we engage in the
activity  of  asking  and  giving  reasons,  when  discussing  about  a  particular  action,
judgement or character?
10 As I will try to show, being clear about Cavell’s conception of the point of moral reasoning
may enable us to understand why Cavell is prepared to draw a connection between moral
reasoning and self-knowledge.
11 Cavell’s immediate interest in the question of the point of moral reasoning is generated
by the sceptical threat that Charles Stevenson levels against the idea of moral rationality:
Stevenson’s account implies, indeed, that there is no such thing as moral reasoning, if by
that we mean a form of discourse in which reasons are related normatively (then only
psychologically)  to  the  judgement  they  support;  moral  exchanges,  in  the  emotivist
perspective  Stevenson  defends,  are  nothing  more  than  attempts to  influence  one’s
interlocutor attitude.23
12 Cavell, in replying to Stevenson, is led to examine a series of assumptions about moral
reasoning  –  assumptions  that  shapes  Stevenson’s  outlook  and  make  his  conclusions
apparently  irresistible.24 Some  of  these  assumptions  bear  on  Stevenson’s  implied
conception of the point of moral reasoning: Stevenson presupposes, among other things,
that the aim of reasoning in general is to reach an agreement over a certain conclusion;
moral exchanges, therefore, may be said to be rational only insofar as they are capable of
producing  convergence  on  a  given  judgement.  The  fact  that moral  arguments  are
characterized by persistent and irresolvable disagreements may then lead one to accept
some version of Stevenson’s picture: moral arguments only appear to be rational, but they
are  nothing  more  than  a  clash  of  conflicting  attitudes.  As  Cavell  observes:  “some
philosophers  have  taken  the  fact  of  moral  disagreement  to  show  the  inherent
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irrationality of moral argument – show it essentially to be a matter of which side has the
greater power, political, rhetorical, psychological, economic.”25
13 Cavell’s strategy, in Part 3 of The Claim of Reason, consists in contesting this picture of
moral  rationality  by  questioning  the  assumptions  that  make  the  picture  apparently
compulsory. With respect to the assumption just mentioned, Cavell begins his rejoinder
by noting that part of its force depends on the idea that science should be seen as the
model of every rational enterprise. The connection between rationality and agreement, in
fact, seems to be a characteristic feature of scientific discourse: scientific arguments are
designed to bring, through the articulation of reasons every practitioner might recognize,
to a conclusion every practitioner must accept. Cavell’s attack on the assumption is here
twofold.  On  the  one  hand  Cavell  observes  that,  even  if  the  description  just  given
characterizes accurately the kind of rationality that belongs to science, it is not clear why
we  should  assume  that  the  rationality  of  science  is  paradigmatic  for  rationality  in
general. On the other hand, and more importantly, Cavell argues that this account of
rationality does not offer a faithful description of the kind of rationality science actually
has. The point emerges, for instance, in the following passage:
But are we any longer quite so willing to take that Aristotelian who refused to look
through Galileo’s telescope in order to “see” the valleys of the moon, as a comic and
irrational  figure?  If  now  a  man refused  to  accept  the  evidence  of  telescopes  as
telling us of the nature of the moon, he would either be (we would regard him as)
irrational  or  else  incompetent  in  science.  That  man  is  no  scientist,  given  the
procedures or canons of science which now constitute that institution. Or again:
what he says will not count for or against any proposition of science. Once these
procedures and canons are established, then agreement is reached in familiar ways;
but  that  simply  means:  agreement  (or  absence  of  disagreement)  about  what
constitutes science, scientific procedure, and scientific evidence, is what permits
particular  disagreement to be resolved in certain ways.  Being a  scientist  just  is
having a commitment to, and being competent at, these modes of resolution.26
14 Cavell is here distinguishing between two levels of agreement: the agreement that those
who are committed to science may reach on a particular conclusion, and the agreement
that these people have in being committed to science – namely, in finding the methods of
science  useful,  interesting,  valuable,  and  so on.  Cavell,  in  this  passage,  proposes  to
connect the rationality of science with this second level of agreement: if someone, now
that the methods of science are established, refused to follow them, he would count as
irrational  not  because  of  his  rejection of  a  particular  conclusion,  but  because  of  his
inability  or  unwillingness  to  see  the importance of  those  methods.  What  makes  this
person irrational, in other words, is his refusal of the kind of interests and values that
sustain our commitment to the procedures of science.
15 As Cavell notes, the dislocation of the connection between rationality and agreement in
the case of science may help us to see the rationality of ethical discourse in a different
light:
If  what  makes  science  rational is  not  the  fact  of  agreement  about  particular
propositions itself, or about the acknowledged modes of arriving at it, but the fact
of a commitment to certain modes of argument whose very natures is to lead to such
agreement, then morality may be rational on exactly the same ground, namely that
we commit ourselves to certain modes of argument, but now ones which do not lead,
in the same ways, and sometimes not at all, to agreement (about a conclusion).27
16 In  this  perspective,  the  fact  of  moral  disagreement  cannot  be  taken anymore  as  an
evidence of the inherent irrationality of moral arguments. While it is true that there
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might  be  irresolvable  moral  disagreement  on  conclusions,  morality  (like  science)  is
characterized by the fact  that  people  agree in being committed to  certain modes of
argument – and the rationality of a given area of discourse is a function, in Cavell’s view,
of this second dimension of agreement. The difference between ethics and science, on this
account, is not adequately expressed by the idea that the former is rational (because it is
capable of  producing agreement on conclusion)  while the latter  is  not  (because it  is
afflicted by interminable disagreements). What characterizes ethics is rather a peculiar
economy of agreement and disagreement: in order to be morally rational, one must agree
with  others  in  being  committed  to  certain  modes  of  discussion;  but  these  modes  of
discussions themselves are not necessarily aiming at producing a convergence on a given
proposition. Here lies, in Cavell’s view, the difference with science: in science, indeed, the
modes of resolution to which we are committed lead an to agreement on a conclusion.
⁂
17 One might still want, at this point, to resist Cavell’s description of rationality, or question
it from a different point of view. It would be possible to object, for instance, that our
commitment to the methods of science is not independent from its ability to produce
convergence on a conclusion. The activity of giving and asking for reasons for a particular
judgement,  indeed,  is  valued  just  because  it  produces  a  convergence  on  a  certain
judgement: the fact that those who are involved in science can proceed from reasons
everyone can recognize to conclusion everyone must accept ensures that the judgement
thus reached is not influenced by imperfect information, arbitrary tastes, relations of
powers, and so on. Our valuing this kind of result explains the point of our engaging in
scientific reasoning: the importance of agreement on conclusions is the importance we
attach to the achievement of  a point of  view that does not resent from any kind of
idiosyncrasy or bias. On the other hand, it is not easy to see the purpose of engaging in a
form of reasoning that does not lead to such an agreed conclusion: what could be the
point of providing reasons in support of a judgement, if the exchange of reasons does not
aim to show to our interlocutor that he must accept the judgement, independently from
the interests, the desires, the values she may happen to have? In order to give substance
to his hypothesis that the rationality of moral arguments does not necessarily involves
convergence on a conclusion, Cavell must provide an alternative account of the point that
such a mode of reasoning may have.
18 While Cavell  does  not  explicitly  address  the issue in these terms,  his  answer to this
concern might be reconstructed by looking at the comparison he draws between moral
reasoning  and  ordinary  epistemological  reasoning  (a  study  of  this  latter  form  of
assessment,  as Cavell  notes,  may illustrate our conception of rationality as clearly as
reflection on scientific  procedures).28 At  a  certain juncture of  the comparison,  Cavell
contrasts  the  point  of  ordinary  epistemological  reasoning  with  the  point  of  moral
reasoning:
Questioning a claim to knowledge takes the form of asking “How do you know?” or
“Why do you believe that?,” and assessing the claim is, we could say, a matter of
assessing whether your position (as Austin put it, your “credential and facts,” your
learning and perception) is adequate to the claim. Questioning a claim to moral
rightness (whether of any action or any judgement) takes the form of asking “Why
are you doing that?,” “How can you do that?,” “What are you doing?,” “Have you
really  considered  what  you’re  saying?,”  “Do  you  know  what  this  means?”;  and
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assessing the claim is, as we might now say, to determine what your position is and
to  challenge  the  position  itself,  to  question  whether  the  position  you  take  is
adequate  to  the claim you have entered.  The point  of  the assessment  is  not  to
determine whether it is adequate, where what will be adequate is itself given by the
form of assessment itself; the point is to determine what position you are taking,
that is to say, what position you are taking responsibility for – and whether it is one I
can respect. What is at stake in such discussions is not, or not exactly, whether you
know our world, but whether, or to what extent, we are to live in the same moral
universe.  What  is  at  stake  in  such examples  as  we’ve  so  far  noticed  is  not  the
validity of morality as a whole, but the nature or quality of our relationship to one
another.29
19 In this passage, the difference between empirical and ethical reasoning is represented as
a difference in their point or aim: while in the empirical case the point of the assessment
is “to determine whether [your position] is adequate, where what will be adequate is itself
given by the form of assessment itself,” in the moral case “the point is to determine what 
position you are taking, that is to say, what position you are taking responsibility for – and
whether it is one I can respect.” How should one understand this contrast?
20 The idea of  “position,”  in this  context,  can roughly be taken to indicate the sort  of
normative responsibilities  that  are associated with a certain role:  someone’s  position
specifies, as Cavell writes a few pages later, “what he is doing and must do and ought to
do.”30 These responsibilities,  in the case of ordinary factual reasoning, involve among
other things a commitment to reply to all the grounds of doubts competently entered: if
someone claims to know that there is a goldfinch in the garden, but then she is not able to
answer the doubts raised by her interlocutors, she cannot insist that she knows that there
is  a  goldfinch  in  the  garden  (if  she  does,  she  will  be  regarded  as  irrational  or
incompetent).31
21 Cavell writes in this sense that the normative commitments associated with this kind of
epistemic position are established in advance by the form of the assessment itself: what 
you  have  to  do,  in  order  to  occupy  legitimately  the  relevant  position,  is  already
determined (you must, for instance, be able to reply satisfactorily to your interlocutors
doubts); and the point of the exchange of reasons, in this context, is one of assessing
whether you do in fact occupy the position to which your claim to know commits you.
22 This point marks, for Cavell, a crucial difference between empirical and moral reasoning.
To use one of Cavell’s own examples, if someone says that her brother must be buried,
and her interlocutor replies that “he is an enemy of the state,” the person can refuse to
answer this ground for doubt without resulting irrational  or incompetent:  she might
reply, in this situation, that she does not care that her brother is an enemy of the state,
and insist in asserting that he must be buried.32 It is important to note that this possibility
does not have a parallel in the empirical case: if someone has defied competently your
conviction that there is a goldfinch in the garden and you have not adequately answered
the doubt, then you cannot insist that you know that there is a goldfinch in the garden
(without being considered irrational).
23 This suggests that, in a moral argument, the relevant normative commitments are not
established in advance by the form of the assessment itself. In the moral case, as Cavell
notes, whether you must accept a certain reason as relevant to your claim is itself part of
the moral conversation; while in the empirical case you cannot decide whether a reason
adduced competently is relevant to the judgement at issue. In ethics, therefore, the point
of the exchange of reasons cannot be to determine whether you actually comply with
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certain already defined requirements (since there are no such requirements). The point
of moral reasoning is rather, as Cavell suggests, one of defining the kind of “cares and
commitments” that we are prepared to recognize: the aim, in other words, is to define
which normative commitments (which “position”) you are acknowledging, not to assess
whether the certain normative commitments known in advance are adequately met. To go
back to Cavell’s example, Antigone, by refusing to be shaken in her conviction by Creon’s
reasons, shows that she values family relations over the honour of the polis: in this sense,
one might say that she is defining her cares and commitments to her interlocutor.
⁂
24 Cavell’s discussion of the difference between factual and moral reasoning contains then a
first indication on the point that the practice of giving and asking for reason might have
in a moral context: such a practice aims to define your cares and commitments, the kind
of things that “you do, you ought to do and you must do.” The indication, though, should
be regarded as incomplete and transitional, for Cavell clearly does not want to say that
moral reasoning has the sole purpose of indicating one’s cares and commitments to one’s
interlocutors.  Such  a  formulation,  indeed,  might  give  the  impression  that  moral
reasoning,  for  Cavell,  has  an  expressive  function  at  best:  moral  arguments,  in  this
perspective,  would  not  involve  the  possibility  of  criticizing  one’s  loyalties  and
attachments. But, as Cavell makes clear, in expressing the kind of reasons that qualify
your position, you are also enabling your interlocutors to “to challenge the position itself,
to question whether the position you take is adequate to the claim you have entered.” In
the course of moral conversations, your cares and commitments are not only declared,
but also questioned.
25 The questioning of  your position may happen in a  variety of  ways.  The remark just
quoted, for instance, suggests that one may criticize your position by assessing whether
your professed concern for the honour of the polis expresses faithfully your position, or if
your adherence to such values conceals others kinds of cares and commitments (say, a
desire for power) of which you are unaware, or all too aware (in such a case, the position
you are actually taking, involving for instance a commitment to power, would not be
“adequate to the claim you have entered,” say the claim that someone is an enemy of the
state). The exchange of reasons might also show you how your professed position has
implications that you have not considered, and that you might be unwilling to accept; or
again,  your  interlocutor  might  question  the  appropriateness  of  the  cares  and
commitments you are taking responsibility for, and urge you to change them.
26 It is in the course of such investigations that we might determine whether we can, as
Cavell writes, “respect” the position of our interlocutors: a clarification of the respective
moral position may enable us to see, for instance, that our interlocutor fully accepts the
kind of responsibility that his professed position implies, or that such a position derives
from a sincere commitment to the moral life, and not from an attempt to bypass or deny
its  requirements.  In  such  cases,  we  might  realize  that  we  respect  our  interlocutor’s
position, even if we cannot share the particular moral judgement she entered.
27 In this sense, Cavell writes that in moral reasoning what is at stake is not “whether you
know our world,” but rather “the nature and the quality of our relationship with one
another.” The point of the exchange of reasons is not here, as in the epistemic case, one
of attesting your competence over a certain fragment of reality, in order to get your
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interlocutors to converge on your judgement. The point of giving and asking for reasons
is rather one of making yourself  intelligible,  in order to enable your interlocutors to
decide whether, and how, they can continue their relationship with you in the face of
your present disagreement. This account provides then an aspect of Cavell’s description
of the point of moral reasoning: the exchange of moral reasons may enable us to maintain
relationships,  when  the  divergences  of  our  cares  and  commitments  threaten  their
continuation. Cavell writes:
Morality […] provides one possibility of  settling conflict,  a  way of  encompassing
conflict which allows the continuance of personal relationships against the hard
and apparently inevitable fact of misunderstanding, mutually incompatible wishes,
commitments, loyalties, interests and needs, a way of mending relationships and
maintaining the self in opposition to itself and to others […] Morality […] provides a
door through which someone, alienated or in danger of alienation from another
through his action, can return by the offering and the acceptance of explanation,
excuses and justifications, or by the respect one human being will show another
who sees and can accept the responsibility for a position which he himself would
not adopt.33
⁂
28 The  idea  that  moral  reasoning  involves  a  questioning  of  our  position  has,  however,
another  implication  –  one  that,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  discussion,  it  is
particularly important to highlight. In the course of moral arguments, it is not only our
interlocutor that gets to know better our cares and commitments: this is true for us as
well.  As  we  have  already  said,  in  exposing  ourselves  to  moral  reasoning,  we  might
recognize a conflict among our cares and commitments of which we were unaware; or we
might  come  to  see  that  our  cares  and  commitments  have  implications  we  are  not
prepared to accept; or again we might recognize that the description we give of our cares
and commitments just masks our real attachments and needs, and so on. In all these
cases, our understanding of our position is deepened and articulated by our participation
in a moral exchange of reasons.
29 This suggests a further way of accounting for the point of moral reasoning, alongside the
purpose of elaborating conflicts with others: when we engage in moral reasoning, we also
aim to clarify the nature of our cares and commitments to ourselves; we aim, in short, at
self-knowledge. As Stephen Mulhall has written, “more is at stake than the laudable and
valuable attempt to maintain one’s regard for and relationship with others  when one
engages in moral debate with someone; Cavell’s claim is that participation in such debates
is essential for self-understanding – for discovering and maintaining one’s relationship
with oneself.”34 The point emerges very clearly, for instance, in the following passage
from The Claim of Reason:
I have described moral arguments as ones whose direct point is to determine the
positions we are assuming or are able or are willing to assume responsibility for;
and this discussion is necessary because our responsibilities, the extension of our
cares  and  commitments,  and  the  implications  of  our  conduct,  are  not  obvious;
because the self is not obvious to the self. To the extent that that responsibility is
the subject  of  moral  argument,  what makes moral  argument rational  is  not the
assumption that there is in every situation one thing that ought to be done and this
may be known, nor the assumption that we can always come to agreement about
what  ought  to  be  done  on  the  basis  of  rational  methods.  Its  rationality  lies  in
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following the methods which lead to a  knowledge of  our position,  of  where we
stand; in short, to a knowledge and definition of ourselves.35
30 The  passage  implicitly  revolves  around  the  question:  why  is  moral  discussion
“necessary”? Why do we engage in it at all? Cavell is here adding another element to the
answer we have begun to expound:  the point  of  moral  arguments is  not  just  one of
encompassing conflicts; such arguments, in fact, allows us to clarify our understanding of
ourselves. Since “The self is not obvious to the self,” we have an interest in a mode of
reasoning  that  enable  us  to  understand  more  clearly  the  content  of  our  cares  and
commitments, and the relation we have with them.
31 Cavell goes on to connect this account of the aim of moral reasoning with his description
of the rationality of moral arguments. Cavell’s implicit argument might be reconstructed
as  follows:  since  what  makes  us  rational  (in  a  given  area  of  discourse)  is  not  our
converging on certain conclusions, but our being committed to the aims of the mode of
discourse at issue; and since one of the aims of moral reasoning is self-knowledge; then
what makes us morally rational  is  (in part)  our commitment to self-knowledge or self
understanding,  our  willingness  to  follow  “the  methods  that  lead  to  knowledge  and
definition of the self.”
32 Cavell’s suggestion is here that someone who is not committed to the methods of self-
knowledge might be irrational from the moral point of view, just like someone who is not
committed to the aims and procedures of science (someone that, for instance, does not
see the point of gathering evidence on heavenly bodies by looking through a telescope)
counts as irrational or incompetent in science. We might gain a better understanding of
this point by considering a possible continuation of Cavell’s fictional dialogue between
Antigone and Creon. One can imagine, for instance, that Antigone may reply to Creon’s
protestation that Polyneices is an enemy of the state and therefore must not be buried by
saying: “If you care so much about the honour of the state, then you won’t want to make
it responsible for such an inhuman deed.” Here Antigone is questioning the nature of
Creon’s  attachment  to  the  polis,  hence  querying  a  fragment  of  his  cares  and
commitments:  the force of  Antigone’s  moral  reason,  therefore,  relies  in this  case on
Creon’s willingness to understand better his own cares and commitments. If Creon, on the
other hand, is not committed to self-knowledge, then the sort of moral reason adduced by
Antigone may not  get  a  grip  on him.  In  this  sense  Cavell  remarks  that  one’s  moral
rationality depends on one’s commitment to methods of self-knowledge: someone who
does  not  share  an  interest  in  self-understanding  would  not  be,  in  this  perspective,
exposed to the force of moral reasons.
33 If Creon did not share that commitment he could, for instance, refuse to give any weight
to  Antigone’s  reason:  he  would  not  see,  in  this  case,  that  the  incoherence  in  his
attachments indicated by Antigone requires him to redefine his position in some way (for
instance, by retorting that his proposal is not inhuman, or by arguing that the honour of
the state exactly requires to give merciless treatment to traitors, and so on). In this case,
his attitude would be one of ignoring the relevance of Antigone’s doubts. But this sort of
stance  is  exactly  what  Cavell  associates  to  the  idea  of  being  morally  irrational,  or
incompetent:
What I cannot do, and yet maintain my position as morally competent, is to deny
the relevance of your doubts […], fail to see that they require a determination by me.
36
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34 This form of moral irrationality, as the example we have been discussing shows, might be
elicited by a lack of interest in self-knowledge.
⁂
35 We are now in the position to sum up the results of our discussions of Part 3 of The Claim
of Reason, and connect them to our original question: why is Cavell prepared to assert that
perfectionism provides a form of moral reasoning? As we have seen, Cavell associates the
point of moral reasoning with two different, but closely interrelated, kinds of aim: moral
reasoning on the one hand aims to permit the continuation of human relationships when
moral  conflicts  threaten their  survival,  and on the other  wishes  to  provide  ways  to
achieve a deeper understanding of one’s position, of one’s cares and commitments. Cavell
also  adds,  relying  on  his  discussion  of  the  difference  between  moral  and  epistemic
rationality, that the aspiration to self-knowledge is what makes moral reasoning rational:
our commitment to self-knowledge, in this perspective, is what makes us exposed to the
force of moral reasons in the first place. As these remarks already indicate, the idea of
self-knowledge, which plays a crucial role both in moral reasoning and in perfectionism,
may  be  pivotal  for  conjoining  the  two  notions.  Here  is  how  Cavell  spells  out  the
connection in a couple of passage extracted from his writings on perfectionism:
Any [moral] theory must, I suppose, regard the moral creature as one that demands
and recognizes the intelligibility of others to himself or herself, and of himself or
herself  to  others;  so  moral  conduct  can  be  said  to  be  based  on  reasons,  and
philosophers will sometimes gloss this as the idea that moral conduct is subject to
questions whose answers take the form of giving reasons. Moral perfectionism’s
contribution to thinking about the moral necessity of making oneself intelligible
(one’s actions, one’s sufferings, one’s position) is, I think it can be said, its emphasis
before  all  on  becoming  intelligible  to  oneself,  as  if  the  threat  to  one’s  moral
coherence comes most insistently from that quarter, from one’s sense of obscurity
to  oneself,  as  if  we  are  subject  to  demands  we  cannot  formulate,  leaving  us
unjustified,  as  if  our  lives  condemn  themselves.  Perfectionism’s  emphasis  on
culture and cultivation is, to my mind, to be understood in connection with this
search for intelligibility, or say search this search for direction in what seems a
scene of moral chaos, the scene of a dark place in which one has lost one’s way.37
[moral perfectionism] focuses […] on the worth of a way of life, of my way of life,
which has come to a crossroads demanding self-questioning, a pause or crisis in
which  I  must  assess  what  has  been  characterized  as  my  being  true  to  myself,
something the romantics […] articulated as the imperative to become the one I am.
The claim of this field of concern to the status of morality is that the conversation
required to assess my life […] is one designed to make myself intelligible (to others,
by way of making myself intelligible to myself).38
36 On the background of this set of remarks, it is possible to understand why Cavell claims
that perfectionism counts as, or provides an interpretation of, moral reasoning. These
passages hark back, implicitly but tangibly, to Cavell’s discussion of moral reasoning in
Part 3 of The Claim of Reason. Cavell describes here the point of moral reasoning in general
as a matter of “making oneself intelligible.” The description conveys in a single formula
the two accounts of the aim of moral reasoning that can be extracted from The Claim of
Reason: “making oneself intelligible” may mean in fact making oneself intelligible to others
(thus managing to encompass otherwise irresolvable conflicts), but also making oneself
intelligible  to  oneself  (thus  achieving a  deeper  understanding of  one’s  own cares  and
commitments).
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37 Now, perfectionism counts as a form of moral reasoning because it is a further articulation
of the “moral necessity of making oneself intelligible”: as Cavell puts the point, “the claim
of [perfectionism] to the status of morality is that the conversation required to assess my
life… is one designed to make myself intelligible.” While the kind of moral arguments
examined in The Claim of  Reason were directed at making the self  intelligible both to
others and to oneself, perfectionism puts its “emphasis before all on becoming intelligible
to oneself.” One might say, in this perspective, that perfectionism is isolating and giving
prominence to a register that is already present in ordinary exchanges of moral reasons
over a certain action: it is this focus on self-understanding that ensures perfectionism’s
relevance to the project of making oneself intelligible, hence to the practice of moral
reasoning. Since self-knowledge counts as an inflection of the idea of making oneself
intelligible, and perfectionism provides methods of self-knowledge, then perfectionism
counts as a mode of moral reasoning.
38 It is important to stress that the line of reasoning we have just sketched accounts not
only for perfectionism’s relevance to moral reasoning, but also shows why, in Cavell’s
perspective, an acknowledgement of perfectionism is vital for moral reasoning. In order
to see this, one must take into account that while perfectionism focuses primarily on self-
knowledge, this dimension of moral thinking is crucial for moral arguments about actions
as well: as we have already said, part of the point of such arguments is provided by the
aspiration to self-knowledge, and it is a commitment to this very aspiration that makes us
morally rational. If one excludes perfectionism from the sphere of moral reasoning, then
one will be inclined to miss the dimension of self-knowledge that characterize, according
to Cavell’s account, also moral arguments about actions: this will result, accordingly, in a
impoverishment or distortion of one’s view of moral reasoning. One might be drawn, for
instance,  to  overlook  the  fact  that  the  articulation  of  moral  reasons  aims  at  the
clarification of one’s cares and commitments. This, in turn, may induce to think that the
point of moral reasoning is not articulating one’s position, but proving that one’s position
is adequate, and that therefore one’s judgement must be accepted. In this perspective, the
aims  of  moral  reasoning  are  assimilated  to  those  that  characterize  ordinary  factual
arguments.  This tendency,  elicited by an exclusion of the concern for self-knowledge
from the area of moral thinking, is described by Cavell as a form of “moralization” of
morality:
It is my impression that in established academic moral philosophy the question of
moral standing, if it comes up at all, is grounded in one’s conviction that one knows
what  is  good  or  right  for  the  other  to  do,  so  that  the  philosophical  issue  is
essentially how to provide convincing, rational reasons for one’s conviction; put
otherwise,  the point of the conversation is getting the other to agree,  or to do,
something. This is one feature of what I sometimes refer to as the risk of moralizing
moral morality.  The point accordingly assigned to moral conversation is that of
rationally  persuading  the  other  to  agree  to,  or  to  do,  something  that  you  are,
independently of the conversation, persuaded that she ought to do.39
39 The question of  moral  standing,  as  Cavell  explains  elsewhere,  is  the question of  the
position from which you confront your interlocutor in a moral conversation: the very fact
that you engage in a moral conversation with someone commits you to ask yourself what
is the nature of your cares and commitments with respect to your interlocutor; as Cavell
puts the point: “if you tell me ‘neither a borrower nor a lender be’, or ‘To thine own self
be true’, you had better have some standing with me from which you confront my life,
from which my life matters to you, and matters to me that it matters to you.”40 Such
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questions, being questions of self-knowledge, are “pushed at the center of the stage in
perfectionism.”41
40 But if we exclude this sort of concern from our view of moral reasoning, then the very
quality of our participation to moral reasoning will be significantly impaired. We might
think, as Cavell suggests, that what licenses us to confront our interlocutors is just the
fact the we are right “independently of the conversation,” and that our only aim is to get
our interlocutors to agree. One might see why such an attitude may count as moralistic:
we are using morality, in this perspective, for aims that are not themselves examined
from a moral point of view. If our attitude is marked by such a refusal of self-knowledge,
the reasons that our interlocutors will put forward in the course of a moral conversation
– reasons pointing at conflicts and opacities in our cares and commitments – will not
probably get a grip on us. In this sense, the omission of the register of self-knowledge
results in a failure in moral reasoning: since our willingness to understand ourselves is
what  makes  us  morally  rational,  an  avoidance  of  self-knowledge  will  impoverish  or
obliterate  our  responsiveness  to  moral  reasons.  These  remarks  may  accordingly
illuminate why Cavell repeatedly asserts that perfectionism “emphasizes a dimension of
moral life any theory of it may wish to accommodate,”42 and that without such an account
“moral reasoning runs the danger of moralism.”43
41 One might sum up the relation between perfectionism and moral arguments by saying
that both these modes of discourse, in Cavell’s view, have a common source: they both
depend  on,  and  are  a  manifestation  of,  one’s  dedication  to  self-knowledge.  In  this
perspective, if someone is committed to moral reasoning, then she must also have an
interest  in  perfectionist  methods  of  self-understanding.  This  coordination  of
commitments illuminates why the perfectionist dimension is not only relevant to moral
reasoning, but also necessary to it: the omission of perfectionism, indeed, may encourage
a representation of moral arguments (and a practice of them) that prescinds from their
relation with self-knowledge.
42 I would like to note, in concluding, that the connection I have just stated can also be read
the other way round: if someone is committed to perfectionism, then she must also be
committed to moral reasoning. This provides an indication on how one might approach,
in Cavell’s perspective, the issue of the scoundrel. The scoundrel, as we have seen, finds
his true self expressed in unacceptable principles: one might say, in this sense, that the
scoundrel is dedicated to the perfectionist quest for one’s real self, but that on the other
hand  he  is  not  committed  to  moral  reasoning;  reflection  on  such  a  character  may
accordingly invite to represent the sphere of morality as radically independent from the
one of self-knowledge.
43 Cavell does not wish to deny the possibility of such a figure: what Cavell’s arguments
suggest is rather that we should question the genuineness of the scoundrel’s commitment
to self-knowledge.  Such a commitment,  as we have seen,  implies a responsiveness to
moral reasons: someone who is interested in expressing one’s nature (and therefore in
understanding oneself) must also be receptive to moral reasons; these reasons indicate, in
fact, conflicts, omissions and opacities in one’s cares and commitment. The scoundrel, in
this perspective, appears as someone who lays claim to the expression of his real self, but
who on the other hand is  not  willing to accept the kind of  contribution to his  self-
understanding that may be provided (in the form of moral reasons) by his interlocutors in
a moral argument. If this is the case, the scoundrel is criticisable not only from the point
of view of morality, but also from the perspective of perfectionism. If morality derives
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from a commitment to intelligibility, then intelligibility to others and intelligibility to
oneself are not separate tasks.
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NOTES
1. Cavell’s account of perfectionism is mainly developed in Cavell 1990 and 2004, though remarks
on perfectionism are scattered all over his more recent output.
2. Rawls  (1971:  286).  An  alternative  definition  of  perfectionism  identifies  the  good  in  the
realization of human essence: in this perspective, the goods mentioned in Rawls’ definition are
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valuable because they promote human flourishing; for this latter account of perfectionism, see
for instance Hurka 1993.
3. Cavell (1990: xxxi).
4. Cavell (2004: 13, 17).
5. See for instance Cavell (1990: xxxi); see also Cavell (2004: 42).
6. Cavell (1990: 1).
7. Cavell (1990: 21); see also Cavell (1990: xxxii, 55).
8. Cavell (2004: 49).
9. See for instance Cavell (2004: 32, 42).
10. For a vivid exemplification of this point, see Cavell ’s discussion of Ibsen’s A Doll’s House in
Cavell (2004: 247-64); see also Cavell (1990: xxxi, 55).
11. This way of defining the notion of perfectionism harks back to Cavell’s  discussion of the
notion of genre, but I cannot follow the details of Cavell’s account here; on Cavell’s discussion of
genre,  see  for  instance  Cavell  (1981:  23-34);  on  the  application  of  this  notion  to  Moral
Perfectionism, see Cavell (1990: 4-8; 2004: 445-7).
12. See for instance Cavell (1990: 57-8). The quotations are extracted from Emerson’s essay Self-
Reliance.  Emerson is  undoubtedly the central  case for Cavell’s  treatment of  perfectionism: on
Cavell’s reading of Emerson as a perfectionist author, see Cavell 1990.
13. Cavell (1984: 218). Cavell’s writings on Kierkegaard precede the explicit introduction of the
notion of moral perfectionism, but Cavell mentions Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript
in his list of perfectionist works (Cavell 1990: 5).
14. On Freud’s relation to perfectionism, Cavell (2004: 282-300).
15. Cavell (1979: 24). Cavell’s discussion of Rousseau is mainly contained in a set of remarks about
the social contract that Cavell presents in The Claim of Reason (1979: 22-8). While Cavell does not
mention The Social Contract in his list of perfectionist texts (his choice falls rather on The Reveries
of a Solitary Walker),  many features of Cavell’s reading of Rousseau’s text clearly prefigure his
elaboration of perfectionism.
16. The pertinence of  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  Investigations  to  perfectionism is  repeatedly
asserted  by  Cavell  (1990:  2).  The  most  sustained  discussion  of  perfectionist  themes  in  the
Investigations is probably to be found in Cavell’s “Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher
of Culture,” collected in Cavell 1989.
17. Cavell (1984: 217).
18. Nietzsche (1983: 127). Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as Educator counts as another central instance
of moral perfectionism; see for instance Cavell’s discussion of this text in Cities of Words (Cavell
2004: 208-26). Another reading of Nietzsche as a perfectionist, explicitly related with Cavell’s, is
offered by J. Conant 2001.
19. Cavell  provides  a  list  of  perfectionist  texts  in  Cavell  (1990:  5).  On  the  exclusion  of
perfectionist authors from the canon of moral philosophy, see Cavell (1990: 5-6; 2004: 5, 13). It is
important to note that Cavell includes in the perfectionist genre also authors and texts whose
relevance for moral philosophy is uncontroversial (such as, for instance, Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mill’s On Liberty).
20. Compare with Foucault’s discussion of modern distrust of care for the self: Foucault connects
the negative association that the idea of caring for the self has for us with the sense that such
outlook involves a form of egoistic concentration on the self (Foucault 2005: 12-3). Cavell, in Cities
of Words, explicitly connect his work on perfectionism with Foucault’s notion of caring for the self
(Cavell 2004: 11). On the relation between Cavell’s elaboration of perfectionism and Foucault’s
notion of the care for the self, see Davidson 1994.
21. Cavell (1990: xxxvi); see also Cavell (2004: 24-5).
22. Cavell (1990: xx).
23. For Cavell’s discussion of Stevenson’s Ethics and Language, see Cavell (1979: 247-91).
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24. See Cavell (1979: 260).
25. Cavell (2004: 25).
26. Cavell (1979: 261).
27. Cavell (1979: 261-2).
28. Cavell (1979: 264).
29. Cavell (1979: 268).
30. Cavell (1979: 325).
31. See Cavell (1979: 267).
32. See Cavell (1979: 267-8).
33. Cavell (1979: 269).
34. Mulhall (1994: 43).
35. Cavell (1979: 312).
36. Cavell (1979: 267).
37. Cavell (1990: xxxi-xxxii).
38. Cavell (2004: 49).
39. Cavell (2004: 235).
40. Cavell (2004: 50).
41. Cavell (2004: 50).
42. Cavell (1990: xxxi).
43. Cavell (2004: 316).
ABSTRACTS
Stanley Cavell presents Moral Perfectionism as a set of methods of self-knowledge, aiming at the
clarification of one’s understanding of oneself. Cavell also claims that Moral Perfectionism is a
form or a dimension of moral reasoning. One might wonder, in this perspective, what relation
can be drawn between perfectionist methods of self-knowledge and the practice of providing
moral reasons for a certain action. In this paper, I propose to understand this connection on the
background of Cavell’s account of moral reasoning in Part 3 of The Claim of Reason. Cavell here
contrasts the rationality of moral discourse with arguments that recur in epistemological and
scientific contexts. While in these latter areas of investigation, the activity of giving and asking
for reasons serves to establish one’s  position (i.e.  one’s  authority to enter a given claim),  in
morality the aim is rather one of making one’s position (that is, one’s cares and commitments)
intelligible, both to others and to oneself. I argue that this account may enable us to clarify to
sense  in  which,  in  Cavell’s  perspective,  perfectionism  is  both  pertinent  and  vital  for  moral
reasoning: since a dedication to self-knowledge is constitutive of moral discourse, the avoidance
of such a dimension may impoverish and distort our conception of moral rationality.
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